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Are beautiful politicians more likely to be elected? To test this, we use evidence from 
Australia, a country in which voting is compulsory, and in which voters are given 
‘How to Vote’ cards depicting photos of the major party candidates as they arrive to 
vote. Using raters chosen to be representative of the electorate, we assess the beauty 
of political candidates from major political parties, and then estimate the effect of 
beauty on voteshare for candidates in the 2004 federal election. Beautiful candidates 
are indeed more likely to be elected, with a one standard deviation increase in beauty 
associated with a 1½ – 2 percentage point increase in voteshare. Our results are robust 
to several specification checks: adding party fixed effects, dropping well-known 
politicians, using non-Australian beauty raters, omitting candidates of non-Anglo 
Saxon appearance, controlling for age, and analyzing the ‘beauty gap’ between 
candidates running in the same electorate. The marginal effect of beauty is larger for 
male candidates than for female candidates, and appears to be approximately linear. 
Consistent with the theory that returns to beauty reflect discrimination, we find 
suggestive evidence that beauty matters more in electorates with a higher share of 
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Better understanding voting behavior is a major challenge in political economy and 
political science. Do voters respond largely to economic outcomes, as the voter 
rationality literature has suggested? Do voters use information shortcuts, relying on cues 
garnered from the physical appearance of a candidate? Or is voting characterized by 
political ignorance, with electors responding to factors that are clearly irrelevant to 
candidate quality? How much can a ‘thin slice’ of information – a photo of a candidate – 
predict about his or her electoral success? 
 
To put these theories to the test, we estimate the relationship between a candidate’s 
physical beauty and his or her electoral success. Our analysis uses data on the electoral 
success of major party candidates in the 2004 Australian federal election (the advantages 
of analyzing Australia are discussed below). We observe a strong relationship between 
our raters’ estimate of the attractiveness of a particular political candidate, and the share 
of the vote received by the political candidate in the 2004 election. This effect is both 
statistically and economically significant. On average, we find that a one standard 
deviation increase in a candidate’s beauty (equivalent to moving from the 50th to the 84th 
percentile of the beauty distribution) is associated with a 1½ – 2 percentage point 
increase in a candidate’s share of the vote. The effect is even larger for particular groups, 
such as male challengers.  
 
Our research is related to four distinct literatures. The first is the literature on rational 
voting, which models voters as responding to economic conditions at either the national 
or individual level. These models have been shown to successfully forecast election 
outcomes in the US (Fair 1978, 2004; Kinder and Kiewiet 1981; Lewis-Beck 1985; 
Wolfers 2002), Australia (Jackman and Marks 1994; Jackman 1995; Cameron and 
Crosby 2000; Wolfers and Leigh 2002) and other developed nations (Alesina, Roubini 
and Cohen 1997; Leigh 2004). Comparing the predictive power of the same economic 
models in Australia and the US, Leigh and Wolfers (2006) conclude that US voters are 
more responsive to economic conditions than Australian voters.  2 
 
 
Other studies have demonstrated systematic deviations from the voter rationality model. 
Ebeid and Rodden (2006) and Wolfers (2007) found that governors are more likely to be 
re-elected when the US economy booms, a pattern also seen in Australian state elections 
(Leigh and McLeish 2009). Leigh (2009) noted that heads of state are more likely to be 
re-elected when the world economy booms. Achen and Bartels (2004) observed that 
governments are less likely to be re-elected when elections are accompanied by droughts, 
flus, or shark attacks. Brennan and Lomasky (1993) argue that since the probability of a 
voter casting the decisive ballot is extremely small, we should expect most voting to be 
expressive (ie. a symbolic act, undertaken for its own sake) rather than instrumental (ie. 
aimed at bringing about particular outcomes). (See also Jones and Hudson 2000; Opp 
2001; Brennan 2001.) From Federation in 1901 until the 2004 election, 4478 federal 
races took place in Australia, and only one was decided by a margin of one vote (none 
have been tied). So the empirical chance of an Australian voter casting a ballot that 
affected the outcome was approximately 1 in 4478.
1 
 
The second body of research that is relevant here are studies in political science showing 
that voters employ ‘information shortcuts’.
2 Lupia (1994) showed that voters in 
California insurance reform elections used information from the recommendations of 
interest groups to emulate the behavior of relatively well informed voters. Based on 
polling evidence, McDermott (1998) demonstrated that voters used candidates’ gender 
and race as a cue to policy positions. Equally, the physical attractiveness of a political 
candidate may be used as an information shortcut by voters, who infer that beautiful 
candidates have other positive traits. 
                                                 
1 The election was for the seat of Ballaarat (later renamed Ballarat) in 1919, when the National Party 
candidate, Edwin Kerby (13,569 votes) beat the Labor candidate, Charles McGrath (13,568). However, the 
courts overturned the result, and McGrath was elected in a by-election in 1920. Therefore, it might be 
better to describe voters in that race as ‘temporarily decisive’. The total number of races is comprised of 
4337 electoral races in general elections, plus 141 by-elections. In the US, Mulligan and Hunter (2003) find 
that the empirical probability of a voter casting the pivotal vote is 1 in 89,000 in Congressional elections, 
and 1 in 15,000 in state legislator elections. 
2 A related issue is whether information shortcuts can substitute for full information. If voter errors are 
random, Condorcet (1785) has shown that they will cancel each other out so long as there are a sufficient 
number of voters. However, Bartels (1996) has argued that information shortcuts are no substitute for full 
information, and has shown that less-informed individuals vote in systematically different ways to more 
informed electors. 3 
 
 
The third set of studies to which this paper relates are those in psychology documenting 
the phenomenon of ‘thin-slicing’, under which ‘[a] great deal of information is 
communicated even in fleeting glimpses of expressive behavior’ (Ambady and Rosenthal 
1992). For voters, casting a ballot based on the attractiveness of the candidate may be 
akin to ‘thin-slicing’. In their review of the literature, Ambady and Rosenthal have shown 
that viewers watching short video clips (with or without sound) can accurately predict 
such outcomes as whether a person is lying, whether a patient is depressed, and whether a 
teacher is effective. Benjamin and Shapiro (2006) have demonstrated that independent 
raters are able to accurately predict the winner of US gubernatorial elections from 
watching a short video clip of the contestants.  
 
The fourth literature to which our work relates are other studies looking at the ‘beauty 
effect’. Following the work of Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) on the Canadian and US 
labor markets, a series of papers have shown that more attractive people earn higher 
wages. This is true within professions such as US attorneys (Biddle and Hamermesh 
1998) and US advertising executives (Pfann, Bosman, Biddle, and Hamermesh 2000), 
and across labor markets as diverse as Australia (Borland and Leigh 2008), Britain 
(Harper 2000), and China (Hamermesh, Meng and Zhan 2002). Similarly, Tao (2008) 
showed that female college graduates in Taiwan who are satisfied with their looks tended 
to earn higher wages. Mocan and Tekin (2009) also present evidence that less attractive 
people are more likely to commit crime. Among economists, Torgler et al. (2008) found 
that happiness researchers are perceived be happier than superstar economists. 
 
In Australia, Britain and the US, the marginal effect of beauty appears to be stronger for 
men than for women. Some evidence exists on elections and beauty, with researchers 
finding a positive effect of beauty in elections to become an officer of the American 
Economic Association (Hamermesh 2006) or a member of a British community board 
(Banducci et al. 2003). In national elections, more beautiful candidates have been found 
to do better in elections to the national parliaments of Finland (Berggren, Jordahl and 
Poutvaara 2006) and Germany (Klein and Rosar 2005). In the US, candidates whose 4 
 
faces were judged to be more competent won more votes in actual elections (Todorov et 
al 2005). While Senator John McCain may have described Washington DC as 
‘Hollywood for ugly people’, the evidence from each of these studies suggests that a 
pleasing physical appearance is positively correlated with electoral performance. 
 
Analyzing Australian elections has two major advantages over previous studies of beauty 
and voting behavior. First, since voting is compulsory in Australia, we are able to 
estimate the effect of attractiveness on voting across the adult population. Second, 
Australian voters arriving at a polling place are almost invariably handed a ‘How to Vote’ 
card for each of the major parties.
3 Since these cards feature a photo of the candidate, we 
can be sure that our measure of beauty matches that of the voter.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II outlines our data and 
rating procedure. Section III presents our main results. Section IV presents a series of 
robustness checks. Section V tests whether beauty effects vary systematically across 
electorates, and the final section concludes. 
 
II. Institutional Background and Beauty Ratings 
 
There are three major political parties in Australian politics. The main left-wing party is 
the Australian Labor Party, and the two right-wing parties are the city-based Liberal Party 
of Australia, and the rural National Party. The two right-wing parties operate in coalition 
with one another, which means that each agrees not to run candidates against a sitting 
member of the other party. Elections to the House of Representatives (on which we 
focus) are conducted by preferential voting, also known as automatic runoff. Voting in 
                                                 
3 Although the major political parties do not keep records on whether their workers cover all booths in 
Australia, conversations with party officials suggest that close to 100 percent of voters are offered a How to 
Vote card by each of the major parties. Other evidence comes from a major website on Australian politics 
(AustralianPolitics.com), which reports that: ‘how-to-vote cards tend to work for the major parties… All 
parties know that it is important to have polling booths staffed on election day so that every voter receives a 
copy of the how-to-vote card...  the ALP and the Liberal Party will have members and supporters working 
in 2-hour shifts handing out cards’. Electoral legislation also assists parties in cases where distribution of 
How to Vote cards would otherwise be difficult. In the case of electors in hospitals and remote areas, the 
Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (s226 and s227) permits parties to supply their How to Vote cards to 
the leader of the mobile polling team, who then distributes them to voters on the parties’ behalf. 5 
 
Australian federal elections is compulsory, and the fine for failing to vote is A$20 
(approximately the median hourly wage). 
 
When Australian voters arrive at a polling place to vote in a federal election, they are 
typically met at the entrance by representatives of the major political parties, and handed 
a ‘How-to-Vote’ card. These cards contain instructions on how to vote for a particular 
party, and invariably include photos of the party leader and that party’s candidate in the 
election. Two sample How-to-Vote cards are shown in Figure 1.  
 





We focus on elections to the federal House of Representatives that were held on October 
9, 2004. Our electoral measure is the share of valid first-preference votes received by a 
particular candidate. We ignore minor party candidates since we were unable to gather a 
comprehensive selection of photos, and because it would not be reasonable to assume that 
minor party candidates handed out How-to-Vote cards at all polling places.  
 6 
 
Our sample of candidates consisted of 286 major party candidates for which we were able 
to obtain photographs.
4 These photos were then compiled into a 21-page PDF document, 
which began with the following instructions:  
 
‘Please score the physical attractiveness of each candidate on a scale of 1 (lowest) 
to 10 (highest) by typing your rating in the box beside each candidate. Please try 
to maintain an average beauty rating of 5. There are 286 candidates.’ 
 
In general, the beauty literature has used a relatively small number of raters. Across 
studies, the modal number of raters is one per person (Hamermesh and Biddle 1994; 
Harper 2000; Hamermesh, Meng and Zhan 2002; Mocan and Tekin 2009; Borland and 
Leigh 2008), though several studies have used four raters to rate each person (Biddle and 
Hamermesh 1998; Pfann, Bosman, Biddle, and Hamermesh 2000; Hamermesh 2006), 
and some have used even more (an average of 25 in Banducci et al. 2003; an average of 9 
in Berggren, Jordahl and Poutvaara 2006; 23 in Klein and Rosar 2005; 40 in Todorov et 
al 2005). However, as well as having a sufficiently high number of raters, it is also 
important to ensure that the raters are representative of the general population (eg. Klein 
and Rosar use 23 raters, but all are students in the same university class). On practice, 
there is a tradeoff between obtaining a large number of raters, and selecting raters who 
are representative of the population. We therefore opted to use four primary raters to 
assess each photograph (a common number in the literature), but to ensure that our raters 
differed from one another in their age and sex.
5  
  
Our raters were chosen to be representative of the Australian electorate, at least on the 
dimensions of age and sex. Since the 25th and 75th percentiles of the age distribution of 
                                                 
4 In practice, we were not able to obtain a full set of How-to-Vote cards for major party candidates in the 
Australian election, since printing and distributing these cards was the responsibility of state party 
branches, whose archives are of variable quality. Our photos were therefore obtained from archived 
versions of party websites, maintained by the National Library of Australia’s Pandora project 
(http://pandora.nla.gov.au/). For the subsample of state party branches for which we were able to obtain 
How-to-Vote cards, we cross-checked photos against those kept on the party websites, and found that in 
almost all instances, candidates used the same photos on the website and How-to-Vote card. 
5 Our decision on how to rate beauty followed the advice of Dan Hamermesh, who has published more 
extensively than anyone else on the relationship between beauty and wages. 7 
 
the Australian electorate are 32 and 57, we selected our raters to be a 29 year old man, a 
32 year old woman, a 57 year old man, and a 57 year old woman.
6 Of our original raters, 
all are of Anglo-Saxon ancestry except the 32-year old woman, who is of Palestinian-
Iraqi ancestry, though she was born in Australia 
 
As a robustness check, we also asked 10 US residents to rate the photos.
7 This was done 
to account for the possibility that some of our Australian raters might have been unable to 
objectively rate the beauty of well-known politicians. Our US raters were all asked to 
inform us if they recognized any of the politicians in the sample. None reported knowing 
any of the Australian politicians. 
 
Our raters were told that the process would probably take them approximately one hour 
(13 seconds per photograph). Most reported that the rating process took somewhat less 
time than this. The Australian raters were given a $20 book voucher to compensate them 
for their time. 
 
Table 1 shows the pairwise correlation patterns between the four Australian raters. The 
correlations are uniformly high, ranging from 0.50 to 0.56. This suggests that – at least 
when it comes to assessing Australian politicians – beauty is not ‘in the eye of the 
beholder’.
8 To the extent that there are any systematic patterns, it appears that the two 
male raters and the two female raters are most similar to one another.  
 
                                                 
6 An original 32 year old male rater showed an apparent bias against certain famous politicians in his 
ratings (eg. he gave the Prime Minister, Treasurer, Foreign Minister and two former Opposition Leaders the 
lowest possible beauty rating), so we asked a new rater (the 29 year old male) to re-rate the photos, and 
substituted his ratings for those of the original rater. 
7 One of the US raters was a 59 year old Pennsylvania resident, while the other 9 US raters were students at 
the University of Michigan, aged in their 20s. The university students were each paid US$20 to compensate 
them for their time. 
8 This is a common finding in the literature on cross-cultural beauty ratings. For a survey, see Langlois et 
al. (2000). 8 
 
 
Table 1: Correlations Between Beauty Raters 
 F32  M29  F57  M57 
F32  1      
M29  0.544 1     
F57  0.561 0.529  1   
M57  0.496 0.556 0.519  1 
Note: All correlations are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. F32 is a 32 year old female, M29 is 
a 29 year old male, F57 is a 57 year old female, and M57 is a 57 year old male. 
 
 
Raters were asked to maintain a mean of 5 in their ratings. The actual means for the four 
Australian raters were 5.6 (F32), 4.3 (M29), 4.3 (F57), and 4.9 (M57). To take account of 
these differences, all ratings are normed to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 
unity. For our main specifications, the ratings of the four Australian raters are then 
summed, and this sum re-normed to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of unity. For 
the purposes of a robustness check (section IV), we combined the ratings of the 10 US 
raters in the same manner. The correlation between the mean Australian raters’ score and 
the mean US raters’ score was 0.765. 
 
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the beauty ratings (Panel A) and vote share (Panel 
B). On average, our raters thought that female candidates were more attractive than male 
candidates, that challengers were more attractive than incumbents, and that Liberal Party 
candidates were more attractive than Labor Party or National Party candidates. For ease 
of interpretation, we express the means of our beauty ratings both as a normed variable, 
and as a percentile rank. For example, the average female candidate was at the 70th 
percentile of the beauty distribution, while the average male candidate was at the 43rd 




Table 2: Summary Statistics for Political Candidates 
 Mean Percentile 
Equivalent
SD N
Panel A: Beauty Rating (in Standard Deviations)
Full sample  0 50 1 286
Men -0.182 43 0.901 212
Women 0.523 70 1.085 74
Challengers 0.143 56 1.035 159
Incumbents -0.179 43 0.927 127
Labor Party  -0.151 44 0.995 149
Liberal Party  0.180 57 0.984 131
National Party  -0.178 43 0.957 6
Panel B: Vote Share (First Preference Votes) 
Full sample  0.418 - 0.112 286
Men 0.419 - 0.114 212
Women 0.415 - 0.106 74
Challengers 0.343 - 0.083 159
Incumbents 0.512 - 0.061 127
Labor Party  0.379 - 0.106 149
Liberal Party  0.460 - 0.103 131
National Party  0.501 - 0.052 6
Note: Beauty rating is the mean beauty rating of the four Australian raters, normed to a mean of zero and a 
standard deviation of unity. Percentile equivalent converts the mean for a particular sub-group to the 
relevant percentile on the normal distribution.  
 
Summary statistics in Panel B show that the average candidate received 41.8 percent of 
the first-preference vote, with men receiving very slightly more votes than women, and 
incumbents receiving more votes than challengers. In our sample, the vote share of 
National Party candidates was highest, followed by Liberal Party candidates, and then 
Labor Party candidates. 
 
According to our Australian beauty raters, the ten most attractive major party candidates 
in the 2004 election were, in descending order: Nicole Campbell (ALP, Bennelong), 
Adam Giles (LP, Fraser), Victoria Brooks (ALP, Riverina), Andrew Laming (LP, 
Bowman), Julie Bishop (LP, Curtin), Kate Ellis (ALP, Adelaide), Sarah McMahon (LP, 
Reid), Michael Keenan (LP, Stirling), Pat Farmer (LP, Macarthur), and Sussan Ley (LP, 
Farrer).
9  
                                                 
9 Conversations with some of these candidates indicated that they had thought carefully about the effect 
that their chosen photograph would have on voters. For example, Kate Ellis told us that because her 10 
 
 
In common with other incumbent candidates, the party leaders were rated as less 
attractive than average. Prime Minister John Howard is at the 5th percentile of the beauty 
distribution. Mark Latham, the Labor Party leader at the 2004 election, was at the 33rd 
percentile (his successors, Kim Beazley and Kevin Rudd, are at the 47th and 15th 
percentiles, respectively). 
 
III. Main Results 
 
We begin by presenting our results graphically, simply plotting candidates’ beauty rating 
against their share of the vote. To do this, we separate the sample along two dimensions. 
First, we distinguish men and women, since voters might be biased for/against female 
candidates, for reasons that have nothing to do with their attractiveness. Second, we 
distinguish challengers and incumbents, since incumbents may have advantages over 
challengers that have nothing to do with their beauty.  
 
Figures 2 to 5 show the scatterplots for male challengers, male incumbents, female 
challengers, and female incumbents. In each case, we also fit a regression line to the data, 
and show the regression equation at the bottom of the graph. The relationship between 
attractiveness and voteshare is positive for all four groups, with the magnitude of the 
beauty coefficient being larger for male candidates than for female candidates. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
appearance had been the subject of some comment in the media during the election campaign, she 




































































































































-2 -1 0 1 2 3
Beauty rating (in standard deviations)
Voteshare = 0.36 + 0.035 * Beauty (t=4.4)
N=119





















































































































-2 -1 0 1 2
Beauty rating (in standard deviations)
Voteshare = 0.52 + 0.017 * Beauty (t=2.3)
N=93


































































-2 0 2 4
Beauty rating (in standard deviations)
Voteshare = 0.34 + 0.005 * Beauty (t=0.5)
N=40


























































-2 -1 0 1 2 3
Beauty rating (in standard deviations)
Voteshare = 0.50 + 0.012 * Beauty (t=0.6)
N=34
Figure 5: Female Incumbents
 
To test the relationship formally, we regress the voteshare received by each candidate on 
their beauty rating. Since the voteshare of the two major party candidates in any 13 
 
particular electorate are negatively correlated with one another, standard errors are 
clustered at the electorate level (there are 150 electorates in the sample).  
 
Table 3 shows the results from this regression. Since the beauty ratings are expressed in 
standard deviations, the coefficient represents the effect of a one standard deviation 
increase in attractiveness. Assuming that the beauty ratings are normally distributed, a 
one standard deviation increase in beauty would be equivalent to moving from the 31st 
percentile of the beauty distribution to the 69th percentile of the distribution; or 
alternatively from the median to the 84th percentile.  
 
In the first column, we omit party fixed effects, and find that a one standard deviation 
increase in beauty is associated with a 2.2 percentage point increase in voteshare. In the 
second column, we add party fixed effects (effectively assuming that none of the 
difference in voteshare between parties is due to differences in the beauty of their 
candidates), and find that the beauty coefficient falls to 1.4 percentage points. The 
remaining columns interact candidate gender/incumbency status with the beauty 
coefficient. We find that the beauty effect is smaller for incumbents and for female 
candidates, though the interaction terms are not statistically significant at conventional 
levels. 
 
Our estimated beauty effects can be compared with the other two countries where the 
relationship between beauty and voteshare has been tested.
10 The specification with party 
fixed effects (Table 3, column 4) implies that in Australian national elections, a one 
standard deviation increase in beauty is associated with a 0.7 percentage point increase in 
voteshare for female candidates, and a 1.8 percentage point increase for male candidates. 
In Finnish national elections, Berggren, Jordahl and Poutvaara (2006) found that a one 
standard deviation increase in beauty implies an increase of 2.5-2.8 percentage points in 
the voteshare of female candidates and 1.5-2.1 percentage points for male candidates. In 
German national elections, Klein and Rosar (2005) find that a one standard deviation 
                                                 
10 The analysis of US Congressional elections by Todorov et al (2005) is not directly comparable with our 
results. 14 
 
increase in beauty was associated with a 1.5 percentage point increase in voteshare for 
female candidates and 0.6 percentage points for male candidates. Yet while the 
magnitude of the effects is quite similar across the three countries, the difference in 
Australia is that the marginal effect of beauty is smaller for male candidates than for 
female candidates. We return to this issue in the conclusion.  
 
Table 3: Are Attractive Candidates More Likely to Win? 
Dependent Variable: Voteshare 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Beauty rating  0.022*** 0.014*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.022*** 
  [0.005] [0.004] [0.006] [0.005] [0.007] 
Incumbent  0.176*** 0.170*** 0.170*** 0.171*** 0.170*** 
  [0.010] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] 
Female  -0.024** -0.013  -0.012  -0.01  -0.009 
  [0.010] [0.009] [0.009] [0.010] [0.010] 
Beauty*Incumbent     -0.011  -0.011 
     [0.008]  [0.008] 
Beauty*Female      -0.011  -0.011 
      [0.009]  [0.009] 
Party FE  No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  286 286 286 286 286 
R-squared  0.6  0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the electorate level, in brackets. ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Is the relationship between beauty and voteshare driven more by a premium for attractive 
candidates or a penalty for unattractive candidates? To test this, we divide the 286 
candidates into three categories of approximately equal size: below average beauty, 
average beauty, and above average beauty, and regress voteshare on indicator variables 
for below-average and above-average beauty. The first column of Table 4 shows that 
candidates of below-average beauty receive 3.2 percent fewer votes, while candidates of 
above-average beauty receive 1.2 percent more votes. This provides some suggestive 
evidence that the effect operates through a penalty for ugliness rather than a reward for 
attractiveness. However, the standard errors are sufficiently large that an F-test cannot 
reject the hypothesis that the below-average and above-average beauty coefficients are 
opposite-signed and equal in magnitude. In column 2, we regress voteshare on average 
beauty and its square, and similarly find that the coefficient on the squared term is 
statistically insignificant.  15 
 
 
Table 4: Attractive Premium or Unattractive Penalty? 
Dependent Variable: Voteshare 
  [1] [2] 
Below Average Beauty  -0.032***   
  [0.009]  
Above Average Beauty  0.012   
  [0.010]  
Beauty rating    0.016*** 
   [0.004] 
Beauty rating
2   -0.004 
   [0.003] 
Incumbent 0.171***  0.170*** 
  [0.009] [0.009] 
Female -0.013  -0.012 
  [0.009] [0.009] 
Party FE  Yes  Yes 
Observations  286 286 
Pseudo R-squared  0.69  0.68 
F-test (H0: Below Average Beauty + Above 
Average Beauty = 0) 
1.33 
[P=0.251]   
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the electorate level, in brackets. ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. In the first column, candidates are divided into 
three equally-sized groups, and the excluded group is candidates of average beauty. 
 
 
IV. Robustness Checks 
 
To test the robustness of the main results in the previous section, we conduct a series of 
robustness checks. The first is to check whether our results are robust to re-specifying the 
key independent variable as the difference in beauty between the major party candidates 
running in a particular electorate. For example, suppose that within a given electorate, the 
Candidate A is of median beauty (beauty rating=0), while Candidate B has a beauty 
rating 0.5 standard deviations below average (beauty rating=-0.5). In this case, the beauty 
gap for Candidate A would be +0.5, while the beauty gap for Candidate B would be -0.5. 
Naturally, the beauty gap can only be estimated in electorates for which we have beauty 
ratings for both candidates, so the sample size falls from 286 to 270. In all specifications, 
standard errors are clustered at the electorate level. 
 
Table 5 shows the results from this regression. In the first column, we estimate the effect 
of beauty ratings for the subsample of 270 candidates. The coefficient on the beauty 16 
 
rating is 1.3 percentage points, close to the estimate in the second column of Table 3 (1.4 
percentage points). Using the beauty gap instead, the coefficient falls to 0.9 percentage 
points. 
 
Since the major party candidates are not the only ones contesting the election, it is 
possible to include both the beauty rating and the beauty gap in the regression. In this 
specification, Beauty rating will most likely capture the effect of beauty on the combined 
voteshare of the major party candidates (relative to minor party and independent 
candidates), while Beauty gap will most likely capture the effect of beauty on one major 
party candidate relative to the other major party candidate. When both are included, the 
coefficients remain positive, though not statistically significant. Together, the results in 
Table 5 suggest that a candidate’s voteshare is affected both by his or her absolute beauty 
(relative to all other candidates) and relative beauty (relative to the other major party 
candidate running in that electorate). 
 
Table 5: Absolute or Relative Beauty? 
Dependent Variable: Voteshare 
  [1] [2] [3] 
Beauty rating  0.013***   0.007 
  [0.004]  [0.004] 
Beauty gap   0.009**  0.005 
   [0.003]  [0.004] 
Incumbent  0.164*** 0.164*** 0.165*** 
  [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] 
Female  -0.012 -0.007 -0.011 
  [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] 
Party FE  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  270 270 270 
R-squared  0.67 0.67 0.67 
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the electorate level, in brackets. ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  Beauty Gap is the difference between the beauty 
ratings of the major party candidates in an electorate.  
 
Our next concern was that our results might be driven by quirks in our rating process. In 
the first column of Table 6, we estimated the results using the separate beauty ratings for 
each of our four raters. We found that the coefficients on the estimates of each rater were 
positive, though only statistically significant for the 32 year old female rater. A test of 
joint significance for the four raters rejects the null at the 5 percent level of significance. 17 
 
 
A related concern is that using Australian raters to assess the beauty of Australian 
politicians might create an endogeneity problem. If our raters gave a higher or lower 
beauty rating to well-known politicians, this might induce bias in our estimates.
11 We 
employ two approaches to address this issue. One is to simply omit the most famous 
candidates from our sample. In the second column of Table 6, we omit those who we 
regard as the eight best-known Australian politicians from our sample. We find no 
evidence that this omission makes any difference to our estimate – the marginal effect of 
a one standard deviation increase in beauty is 1.4 percentage points, precisely the same as 
the corresponding estimate for the full sample (Table 3, column 2). 
 
Another approach is to use beauty raters who cannot distinguish between successful and 
unsuccessful Australian politicians. As outlined above, we asked 10 US residents to rate 
the beauty of all the candidates, and found a very high correlation (0.765) between the 
average of their ratings and the average of the US raters. In the third column of Table 6, 
we use the mean US rating in place of the Australian raters’ assessment. Using US raters, 
we find that a one standard deviation increase in beauty leads to a 1.1 percentage point 
increase in voteshare. An alternative approach is to instrument the Australian raters’ 
beauty ratings with the US raters’ score. The results of this specification are shown in the 
fourth column, and indicate that a one standard deviation increase in beauty leads to a 1.5 
percentage point increase in voteshare. 
                                                 
11 Another possibility is that successful politicians are more likely to ‘primp’ for their photos in subsequent 
elections. With only one measure of each politician’s attractiveness, we are unable to adjust our estimates 
to take account of this. 18 
 
 
Table 6: Are Beauty Ratings Endogenous? 
Dependent Variable: Voteshare 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] 





Use US raters 
(reduced 
form) 
Use US raters 
(IV) 
Beauty  Rating   0.014***  0.015*** 
   [0.004]  [0.005] 
Rating F 32  0.011**       
  [0.005]     
Rating M 29  0.001       
  [0.005]     
Rating F 57  0.002       
  [0.006]     
Rating M 57  0.005       
  [0.005]     
US Beauty rating      0.011***   
     [0.004]   
Incumbent  0.170*** 0.169*** 0.168*** 0.171*** 
  [0.009] [0.009] [0.008] [0.009] 
Female  -0.015 -0.011 -0.005 -0.014 
  [0.010] [0.009] [0.008] [0.009] 
Party  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  286 278 286 286 
R-squared  0.68 0.67 0.67 0.68 
F-test for joint 
significance of 4 raters 
3.10 
[P=0.0175]     
F-test on excluded 
instrument      444.95 
[P=0.000] 
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the electorate level, in brackets. ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Famous candidates are defined as Latham, Crean, 
Beazley, Abbott, Howard, Downer, Costello and Nelson.  
 
 
Another possibility is that what we observe as beauty is actually a function of the 
ethnicity or age of the candidates. Since the majority of Australian voters, and three out 
of four of our Australian beauty raters, are of Anglo-Saxon ancestry, we might worry that 
we are capturing some form of bias against non-Anglo candidates. To test this, we 
exclude 23 candidates who do not appear to be of Anglo-Saxon ancestry.
12 The results of 
this specification are shown in the first column of Table 7. Dropping the non-Anglo 
                                                 
12 Coding of candidates age and ethnicity was based purely on candidates’ photos, since public information 
on age and ethnicity is only available for members of parliament (ie. those who received a large share of 
the vote). 19 
 
candidates has no notable impact on the beauty coefficient, which rises from 1.4 
percentage points to 1.5 percentage points.  
 
Another possibility is that the effect of beauty is merely capturing differences in age. To 
test this, we code the approximate age of each candidate, and control for either a linear or 
quadratic term in age. These results are shown in the second and third columns of Table 
7. In both cases, the age coefficients are close to zero and statistically insignificant. 
 
Table 7: Is it Ethnic Discrimination or Age Discrimination? 
Dependent Variable: Voteshare 
  [1] [2] [3] 
 Excl  Non-Anglo 
Candidates  Control for Age  Control for Age 
and Age
2 
Beauty rating  0.015*** 0.014*** 0.016*** 
 [0.004]  [0.004]  [0.005] 
Incumbent  0.167*** 0.170*** 0.169*** 
 [0.010]  [0.009]  [0.009] 
Female  -0.015 -0.013 -0.013 
 [0.010]  [0.009]  [0.009] 
Age   0.000  0.000 
   [0.000]  [0.001] 
Age
2     0.000 
     [0.000] 
Party FE  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 263  286  286 
R-squared  0.68 0.68 0.68 
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the electorate level, in brackets. ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
V. Productivity or Discrimination? 
 
An open question in the literature on the economics of beauty is the extent to which 
returns to beauty – in this case the increased probability of election – reflect productivity 
or discrimination.
13 This is a particular issue in the case of politicians, whose job involves 
significant personal interaction. To the extent that voters believe that more attractive 
individuals are better able to persuade other legislators of their viewpoint, manage public 
meetings, and convey their ideas through the media, they may form the view that 
beautiful politicians are more effective. Alternatively, it may be the case that the success 
                                                 
13 For an attempt to disentangle the productivity and discrimination hypotheses, see Mobius and Rosenblat 
(2006). 20 
 
of better-looking politicians reflects nothing more than taste-based discrimination on the 
part of voters. 
 
To separate these two effects, we use data from previous Australian Election Surveys 
(AESs) to form measures of the share of apathetic voters in each electorate. Since a 
typical AES contains only about 12 respondents per electorate, we pool the 1996, 1998 
and 2001 surveys to obtain a larger sample.
14 As a proxy for voter apathy, we use three 
questions:  
•  ‘Would you say you cared a good deal which party won the Federal election or 
that you did not care very much which party won?’ (Cared a good deal/ Did not 
care very much/ Did not care at all) 
Apathetic respondents are those who chose ‘Did not care at all’.  
Electorate mean: 4.8 percent (SD=3.8 percent) 
•  ‘Generally speaking, how much interest do you usually have in what’s going on in 
politics?’ (A good deal/ Some/ Not much/ None) 
Apathetic respondents are those who chose ‘None’. 
Electorate mean: 4.0 percent (SD=3.3 percent) 
•  ‘And how much interest would you say you took in the election campaign 
overall?’ (A good deal/ Some/ Not much/ None at all) 
Apathetic respondents are those who chose ‘None at all’. 
Electorate mean: 4.8 percent (SD=3.8 percent) 
 
Combining the three surveys gives an average of 37 respondents per electorate. The 
electorate-level means and standard deviations for each question are listed above. Across 
electorates, the means for the three questions are highly correlated, with bivariate 
correlations around 0.5. 
 
We use each question to divide the electorates into two halves. ‘Apathetic electorates’ are 
defined as those in which a greater than average share of voters are apathetic. ‘Engaged 
                                                 
14 For the two electorates that were created in the 2003 redistribution, the apathetic voter variable takes the 
mean of the main electorates covering that area in the 2001 election. Thus Bonner is the average of the 
electorates of Bowman and Griffith, while Gorton is the average of Burke, Calwell and Maribyrnong. 21 
 
electorates’ are those in which a smaller than average share of voters are apathetic.  We 
assume that voters in engaged electorates are more concerned with choosing the best 
candidate than are voters in apathetic electorates. Thus if voters primarily respond to 
beauty because of productivity, then voters in engaged electorates should be more 
responsive to beauty than voters in apathetic electorates. Conversely, if voters primarily 
respond to beauty because of discrimination, voters in apathetic electorates should be 
more responsive to beauty than voters in engaged electorates.  
 
The first two columns of Table 8 show the results of these regressions. Using any of the 
three measures of voter apathy, we find a larger response to beauty in apathetic 
electorates than in engaged electorates. In apathetic electorates, the effect of a 1 standard 
deviation increase in beauty on voteshare ranges from 1.6 to 2.4 percentage points. In 
engaged electorates, the effect of a 1 standard deviation increase in beauty on voteshare is 
between 0.9 and 1.4 percentage points. However, the difference between the two sets of 
electorates is only statistically significant in Panel B (where voter apathy is proxied by 
the share of respondents who have no interest in politics).  
 
In the third column of Table 8, the apathetic voters variable is normed to a mean of zero 
and a standard deviation of unity, and interacted with a candidate’s beauty. For all three 
voter apathy proxies, the coefficient on the interaction term is positive (suggesting that a 
1 standard deviation increase in the share of apathetic voters raises the returns to beauty 
by 0.1 to 0.6 percentage points). However, the interaction coefficient is only statistically 
significant in Panel B, and then only at the 10 percent level. Overall, the evidence points 
towards the hypothesis that the rewards to beautiful political candidates reflect 




Table 8: Returns to Beauty and Voter Apathy 
Dependent Variable: Voteshare 
  [1] [2] [3] 
Sample:   Apathetic 
electorates 
Engaged 
electorates  All 
Panel A: Apathy Proxied by Share Who Do Not Care Who Wins 
Beauty rating  0.016** 0.013**  0.014*** 
  [0.006] [0.006] [0.004] 
Incumbent  0.188*** 0.152*** 0.170*** 
  [0.015] [0.011] [0.009] 
Female  -0.015 -0.009 -0.013 
  [0.016] [0.010] [0.009] 
Beauty rating * Share of apathetic voters     0.001 
     [0.004] 
Share of apathetic voters     -0.002 
     [0.003] 
Party FE  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  129 157 286 
R-squared  0.65 0.72 0.68 
Panel B: Apathy Proxied by Share Who Are Not Interest in Politics 
Beauty rating  0.024*** 0.009* 0.014*** 
  [0.007] [0.005] [0.004] 
Incumbent  0.177*** 0.167*** 0.171*** 
  [0.015] [0.012] [0.009] 
Female  0.001 -0.022** -0.012 
  [0.017] [0.011] [0.009] 
Beauty rating * Share of apathetic voters     0.006* 
     [0.004] 
Share of apathetic voters     0.001 
     [0.002] 
Party FE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  120 166 286 
R-squared  0.65 0.71 0.68 
Panel C: Apathy Proxied by Share Who Have No Interest in the Election 
Beauty rating  0.017*** 0.014** 0.015*** 
  [0.006] [0.005] [0.004] 
Incumbent  0.159*** 0.175*** 0.171*** 
  [0.013] [0.013] [0.009] 
Female  0.006 -0.031*** -0.013 
  [0.014] [0.011] [0.009] 
Beauty rating * Share of apathetic voters     0.005 
     [0.004] 
Share of apathetic voters     0.005* 
     [0.003] 
Party FE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  131 155 286 
R-squared  0.64 0.71 0.68 
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the electorate level, in brackets. ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. For columns 1 and 2, electorates are split into two 23 
 
halves. ‘Apathetic electorates’ are defined as those in which a greater than average share of voters are 
apathetic. ‘Engaged electorates’ are those in which a smaller than average share of voters are apathetic. In 
column 3, the share of apathetic voters is normed to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of unity.  
 
 
VI. Conclusion and Implications 
 
Using data from the 2004 Australian election, we test whether more attractive candidates 
are more successful. We find a strong positive relationship between our raters’ 
assessment of beauty and candidates’ share of the vote. Holding constant gender, 
incumbency, and party fixed effects, a one standard deviation increase in a candidate’s 
beauty is associated with a 1.4 percentage point increase in voteshare.  
 
This effect is not only statistically significant; it is also politically salient. In the four 
Australian federal elections held between 1996 and 2004, one in ten races were decided 
by a margin of less than 1.4 percentage points.
15 This suggests that one in ten races could 
have been decided differently if a major party candidate of median beauty was replaced 
by a candidate at the 84th percentile.  
 
We find that the effects of beauty on voteshare are not uniform. The impact of beauty 
appears to be larger for male candidates and for challengers. However, we cannot reject 
the hypothesis that the relationship between beauty and voteshare is linear. Our results 
are robust to using the beauty gap between candidates in place of absolute beauty ratings, 
to dropping well-known politicians, to using US raters in place of our Australian raters, to 
excluding candidates of non-Anglo Saxon appearance, and to controlling for age.  
 
Given that the media and popular culture devote more attention to feminine beauty than 
masculine beauty, our finding that the marginal effect of beauty is larger for male 
candidates than for female candidates may seem surprising. In our view, the most likely 
explanation is that female beauty carries some negative connotations, such as lower 
intelligence (the ‘dumb blonde syndrome’). In their meta-analysis of the psychology 
                                                 
15 Using two-party preferred data for the 1996, 1998, 2001 and 2004 elections, we found that 58 of the 595 
races were decided by a margin of less than 1.4 percentage points. 24 
 
literature on beauty and intellect, Jackson, Hunter and Hodge (1995) find that physical 
attractiveness has a stronger effect on perceptions of males’ intellectual competence than 
females’ intellectual competence.
16 Holahan and Stephan (1981) attribute this to a 
societal stereotype ‘that defines high levels of beauty and competence as incompatible 
traits for women’. 
 
Our finding that beauty matters more for challengers than incumbents is consistent with a 
model in which attractiveness is used as a substitute for other sources of information 
about a candidate’s competence. At one extreme, if voters have never heard of a 
candidate before they arrive at the polling place, the candidate’s beauty may provide the 
strongest signal of competence. At the other extreme, voters in the electorate of Prime 
Minister John Howard, most likely have a good knowledge of Howard as a politician, 
making it largely irrelevant that his physical beauty rating is lower than 95 percent of all 
candidates. Consistent with theories of thin-slicing and information shortcuts, beauty will 
have a smaller impact on voting behavior if constituents already possess substantial 
information about a candidate.  
 
Lastly, we present some suggestive evidence on the question of whether the effect of 
beauty represents productivity or discrimination. In electorates where a higher share of 
voters say that they do not care who wins, that they are not interested in politics, and that 
they are not interested in the election, the marginal effect of beauty is larger. On the 
assumption that apathetic voters are more likely to discriminate, and engaged voters are 
more likely to choose based upon productive characteristics, this suggests that the effect 
of beauty on voteshare is more likely to reflect discrimination than returns to 
productivity. 
 
                                                 
16 For example, Holahan and Stephan (1981) found that when male subjects were asked to evaluate a well-
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